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1. Introduction
Customary International Law (CIL) is one of the primary sources of the contemporary international legal
system.1 It consists of numerous rules that uniformly bind states and other entities.2 Furthermore, CIL can
be a valuable tool to govern relationships between states when no specific treaty governs the matter at
issue.3 Different international bodies have applied CIL on a variety of occasions to adjudicate various
disputes between states.4
However, despite the current use of custom in international law, it has been suggested that CIL is a
rather unnecessary element of the international legal system.5 Some have argued that it is more sensible
to rely on treaty law and abandon customary law as a needless relic of the past.6 Following up on this
uncertainty about the value CIL contributes to international law, this article will address the fundamental
question of whether CIL is an essential part of the international legal system. To do so, this article will
focus on the merits of legitimacy both as both a subjective and as an objective criterion of the right to
govern.
The first section of this article will provide an overview of the concept of CIL. It will explore the legal
nature and development of CIL. Using a variety of sources, it will describe the contemporary state of CIL in
detail, including the process of assessing state practice and opinio juris. The analysis will rely on certain
judgments by the International Court of Justice, a study of CIL by the International Law Commission, and
several academic contributions.
The second section will address the theoretical framework of legitimacy, its reflection in international
law, and the different concepts and notions of legitimacy. The importance of legitimacy will be analyzed in
light of the legal, moral, and social perceptions of legitimacy. These concepts will lay the foundation for
assessing the legitimacy of CIL.
The last section will assess CIL on the merits, using each of the concepts of legitimacy. It will start with
the question of the legal legitimacy of CIL and then turn to assessing the moral and social legitimacy of
CIL. The conclusion will address the implications of this assessment.
1.1. Customary international law: Overview of the concept
To assess the legitimacy of CIL, it is sensible to start with a comprehensive overview of custom as a
source of international law. The international law system is substantially different from classical national
legal systems.7 National systems usually each operate within a framework of legislatures that enact laws,
with executive and judicial organs that act in the established legal framework.8 In contrast, no central
1David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1987).
2It is not precisely clear if CIL can bind international organizations. See generally Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the
Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability, 51 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 301, 323–27 (2010).
3See generally Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 273–285
(1976).
4See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (20 Feb.); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13 (3 June).
5Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116–75 (2005).
6Id. at 116-17; see also David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of
Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 198 (1996).
7GODEFRIDUS J. H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1983).
8See generally M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed. 1998).
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authority enacts laws in the sphere of international law.9 Furthermore, international law embraces the
supremacy of a state’s sovereignty, and its consent is a prerequisite to being bound by law.10 Accordingly,
such qualities directly affect the sources of international law and their application.
One of the consequences is that the sources of international law are not embodied in any universally
binding documents.11 The most widely recognized list of sources of international law is in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice.12 Article 38 of the Statute provides that:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules
of law.13
The concept of customs is reflected in paragraph “b” of Article 38(1).
From a theoretical standpoint, it would appear impossible to find any society that does not have
general rules and norms of behavior. These customs are one of the oldest ways to regulate lives of
different communities.14 Customs are unwritten rules. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “custom” as
“an action or way of behaving that is usual and traditional among the people in a particular group or
place.”15 In the legal sphere, customs go farther: they represent a notion of legally binding rules rather
than a pattern of behavior. A pattern of behavior that possesses the characteristics of a legally binding
rule can be found not only at the local level, but also within the system of international law. At the level
of international law, such a concept is represented by the term customary international law.
To an extent, CIL can be considered a last resort in disputes over international law. When there is no
applicable, legally-binding treaty, it is always possible to argue that a certain rule has crystallized within
CIL. However, it is a rather complicated task to prove the existence of a customary rule because to do so
requires strong evidence of the existence of two fundamental elements.16 Those elements can be derived
9See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (7th ed. 2014). It has been argued that the Security Council
was turned into a world legislature after SC Resolutions 1373 and 1540 imposed obligations on all member states. On the
other hand, the practice of the Security Council is rather minimal.
10Id.; see generally David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed? in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 162–176 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds.,
2003); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force
27 Jan. 1980).
11Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1–2; For example, one can imagine a State that is not a party to the U.N. Charter/I.C.J.
Statute and, therefore, not bound by Article 38 of the Statute.
12United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 Apr. 1946, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1¼4&
p2 ¼ 2.
13Id. at art. 38(1).
14See, e.g., MANJUSHREE PATHAK, TRIBAL CUSTOMS LAW AND JUSTICE (2005).
15Custom, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/custom (last visited 12 Jan. 2015).
16See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Identification of customary international law, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml
(last updated 3 May 2017); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. { 188 (27 June).
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from the Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute, and they are State practice and opinio juris, as was affirmed in the
Libya/Malta case.17
The meaning, content, and sources of state practice and opinio juris will be further examined in the
next sub-sections.
1.2. State practice in customary international law
State practice is the first element of CIL. State practice constitutes a “material or objective” component of
CIL that consists of past actions of states.18 Those actions can take a variety of different forms and can be
derived from a number of sources. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law provides a general list
of possible sources of State practice, including:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of government legal
advisers, official manuals on legal questions (e.g. manuals of military law), executive decisions and
practices, orders to military forces (e.g. rules of engagement).19
All of the above-mentioned sources can be used to support the existence of a State practice. Going
further, Sir Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission, has provided a list of
possible physical actions that can constitute State practice. According to Wood, events like the passage of
ships in international waters, conduct during a warfare, diplomatic asylum practice, and others events can
be used as evidence of State practice.20
The foregoing lists of practices and acts, however, are non-exhaustive, and there is, furthermore, a
broad range of other types of sources that can be used to argue State practice. In a report to the I.L.C., for
example, Wood identified sources for authoritative views on the existence of CIL norms per se. The list
includes:
the case law of the International Court of Justice and other courts and tribunals; the work of other
bodies, such as the International Law Association; and the views of publicists, in particular as to
the general approach to the formation and evidence of customary international law.21
This list provides, not the sources of State practice, but rather a list of places where CIL norms can be
found or reflected.
When arguing for the formation of a CIL norm, there are four main factors that can be used to assess
State practice: “duration, consistency, repetition, and generality.”22
Generality and repetition refer to a strong, common pattern of state behavior. More specifically, in most
of the cases, establishing State practice requires demonstrating a similar pattern of behavior by multiple
17Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. at { 27.
18Int’l Law Comm’n, Second report of the Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood on identification of customary
international law, U.N. A/CN.4/672, at 15 (2014) [hereinafter, Wood, Second Report]; see also Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. {{ 97–98, 184.
19JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 2012).
20Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 21; see also Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Judgment, 1960 I.C.J.
Rep. 6, 40–41 (12 Apr.); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, 277 (20 Nov.).
21Int’l Law Comm’n, First report of the Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood on formation and evidence of customary
international law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663, 19 (2013).
22See SHAW, supra note 9, at 54; NOUT VAN WOUDENBERG, STATE IMMUNITY AND CULTURAL OBJECTS ON LOAN 40 (2012); see
also Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor., 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (18 Dec.); North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at 43.
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states.23 Wood has also argued that the practice should be “extensive or, in other words, sufficiently
widespread.”24
An assessment of the weight of State practice therefore generally should be conducted on a case-by-
case basis.25 As part of this approach, the behavior of certain states may have more weight than the
behavior of others. These so-called “specially affected States” are “affected or interested to a higher
degree than other States.”26 An example of the specially-affected States approach can be seen by an
opinion of International Court of Justice Judge Petrén, when he argued that “It would be unrealistic to
close one’s eye to the attitude, in that respect, of the State with the largest population in the world.”27
According differing weights to the practices of different states it not necessarily a valid approach, though,
because it is also important to pay attention to the sovereign equality of states. On the other hand,
one can think of many instances in which one state may be more concerned with certain issues than
another state.
Another essential factor to support a State practice argument is consistency. This criterion was
addressed in the 1950 Asylum case heard by the I.C.J.28 The court stated that State practice should be
“uniform usage practiced by States in question.”29 The criterion of consistency has been further developed
to now require that a customary rule should have “a core meaning that does not change.”30 This factor is
essential to keep a custom from too broad or too vague a meaning.
However, there is no requirement for State practice to be absolutely universal.31 As was suggested by
the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case, a state action contrary to a common pattern of State practice may be
considered not as reflecting inconsistency in the practice, but rather as a breach of an already crystallized
rule.32 On the other hand, it is also important to keep in mind that CIL can evolve in its meaning
over time.
The duration of State practice factor generally concerns the amount of time needed to establish the
existence of a customary rule. The classical approach required the passage of a long amount of time
before a state can claim the existence of a CIL norm.33 However, the more contemporary view places no
specific requirements on the amount of time for the crystallization of a CIL norm.34 As was stated in the
North Sea Continental Shelf case, “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of
23See generally Mark A. Weisburd, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31 U. PENN. J.
INT’L L. 295 (2009).
24Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 7; see also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 45, 52 (25 July).
25U.K. v. Ice., 1974 I.C.J. Rep. at 52; Wood, Second Report, at 36.
26Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 36; William Thomas Worster, The Transformation of Quantity into Quality:
Critical Mass in the Formation of Customary International Law, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 63 (2013); North Sea Continental Shelf
case, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. { 73; U.K. v. Ice., 1974 I.C.J. Rep. at 47.
27Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 306 (20 Dec.).
28Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. at 266.
29Id. at 275.
30Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 7.
31Id. at 34; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at 104.
32Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. { 186.
33MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS, WITH
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 24 (1985).
34Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 40; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. { 76.
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itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law.”35 Therefore, it appears that the
time requirement should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The foregoing criteria and sources have offered guidelines for assessing State practice. It is now time
to turn to the second element of CIL: Opinio Juris.
1.3. Opinio juris and customary international law
Opinio juris, or opinion juris sive necessitates, is the subjective or psychological element of CIL. The
precise definition of opinio juris was provided by the I.C.J. in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.
According to the court, opinio juris exists when states “believe . . . themselves to be applying a mandatory
rule of customary international law”36 or “felt legally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a
rule of customary law obliging them to do so.”37 In essence, opinio juris is the subjective perception of a
certain rule as legally binding under CIL.
There are several ways to prove the existence of opinio juris. In certain circumstances, state actions
per se can show the presence of opinio juris. According to one of Wood’s reports, it can be argued that
“acceptance as law” can be derived from the conduct of states.38 Accordingly, sources of State practice
can play a role in the argument over opinio juris. However, careful assessment is necessary because
certain actions can be “only a statement of political intention and not a formulation of law.”39
In addition, the International Law Commission has proposed a list of possible sources of evidence of
opinio juris. It consists of the following:
A non-exhaustive list of such materials includes positions of States before international
organizations (including written comments and responses to questionnaires) or international
conferences; pronouncements by municipal courts; statements before international courts and
tribunals; stipulations in arbitration agreements; diplomatic practice and notes; a State’s actual
conduct (as opposed to its stated positions); a State’s treaty practice; multilateral treaty practice;
as well as a variety of international instruments.40
Furthermore, assessing opinio juris requires high awareness of “fact, degree and value.”41 In-depth
research is necessary to convincingly argue the presence of opinio juris. Accordingly, any sources used
should be carefully and comprehensively analyzed.
It is essential to stress that the frequency of conduct does not reflect the presence of opinio juris.
As was stated by the I.C.J., “the frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.”
35North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. { 76.
36Id.
37Id. { 78.
38Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 57; The International Court of Justice, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Reports 246, 299 (12 Oct.).
39Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 107, A/C.1/SR. 1423,
December 1965, p. 436.
40Int’l Law Comm’n, Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat on Formation and evidence of customary international
law, U.N. A/CN.4/659, at 21 (2014).
41C. L. Lim & O.A. Elias, Proving Opinio Juris, and Customary International Law 7 (Geneva, Discussion Paper, June 2013),
https://law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/opiniojuris/panel_3-lim_and_elias-_proving_opinio_juris_and_customary_international_law.
pdf (criticising the Nicaragua case on the merits of CIL assessment).
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To add some more confusion to the matter, in certain circumstances even a lack of any action can be
considered as evidence of opinio juris.42
Brian D. Lepard has offered an additional possible factor in considering opinio juris. He has suggested
that the legal standing of the authority in question should play an important role.43 For example, he has
argued that the decisions of the U.S. President or the U.S. Congress should have more value as evidence
of opinio juris because they are made by elected officials and, therefore, have a bigger claim to reflect the
will of people in comparison to the decisions of appointed officials.44 However, the importance of the will
of the people as a consideration is not clearly recognized as a factor in determining international law.
Therefore, Lepard’s proposal, while interesting, is not compelling in its logic.
To summarize, it is a rather complicated and demanding process to prove the existence of a customary
rule. Numerous examples of actual practices will have to be offered. Furthermore, in-depth analysis of the
states’ intent is required to make a strong argument. Finally, while opinio juris must be argued, certain
aspects of opinio juris are still rather unclear.
To continue its appraisal of CIL, this article will now turn to defining the concept of legitimacy.
2. Legitimacy and international law: An overview
It is widely argued that legitimacy can foster compliance with the law.45 In general terms, a sense of duty
to obey a rule can convince entities to submit to a rule in question. For example, legitimacy can play a
crucial role when it is not within a state’s interests to obey a certain rule. The notion of a legitimate
obligation may nonetheless push such a state toward compliance with the undesired rule.46
As will become evident from the discussion here, however, the concept of legitimacy can be
understood in many different ways. Furthermore, the question of legitimacy is a relatively new topic in
international legal discourse.47 Thomas M. Franck introduced the argument over this issue at the end of
the Cold War in his article Legitimacy in the International System.48 In his work, Franck raised the concern
that the academic literature of the time was giving all its attention to the concept of legality and had
almost forgotten the concept of legitimacy.49
Franck’s work sparked an ongoing dialogue on the question of legitimacy.50 Over time, however, the
major focus in the legitimacy discussion has shifted somewhat from general international law to individual
42Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 63; Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. at 266.
43BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 171–191 (2010).
44Id. at 175.
45See generally Hyeran Jo & Catarina P. Thomson, Legitimacy and Compliance with International Law: Access to
Detainees in Civil Conflicts, 1991–2006, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 323–55 (2014); Jonathan Jackson et al., Compliance with the
law and policing by consent: notes on police and legal legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29–49
(Adam Crawford & Anthea Hucklesby eds., 2012).
46See generally Jo & Thomson, supra note 46; Jackson, supra note 46. One can explain such a consequence by strong
political pressure or other variables.
47Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations 2 (Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc. 2011 Annual
Meeting Paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1900289 (last revised 26 Jan. 2012).
48Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1988).
49Id. at 706-07.
50See generally Jean d’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandere, The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law:
The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 190 (2011); John Tasioulas, Human Rights,
Legitimacy, and International Law, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2013).
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governments and to democracy as a criterion of legitimacy.51 The question of the legitimacy of
governments within states, however, is far removed from the question of legitimacy of the primary sources
of international law per se.52 The shift in focus has led to an absence of general criteria for legitimacy
under international law. This part of this article will therefore provide insights and propose possible criteria
of legitimacy for international law and, in particular, for CIL.
The starting point of this investigation is the definition of legitimacy. The Oxford Dictionary provides
that legitimacy is “Conformity to the law or to rules.”53 Beetham has proposed a slightly different
approach, arguing that legitimacy is the “justification and acceptance of political authority.”54 Beetham’s
definition has been broadly accepted in political science and international law.55 It can be argued that
justification of authority can flow from conformity with certain rules, and thus bring together the Oxford
and Beetham definitions. From this viewpoint, the justification of a political authority can be based on
positive law. In other words, in a narrow sense, if an authority complies with the positive law it can be
considered legitimate. However, this is only one out of many possible views of legitimacy. In particular,
acceptance as a qualifier for legitimacy requires some clarification. Furthermore, such a narrow criterion for
legitimacy is problematic.
In his work The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law, Chris Thomas stressed that it is hard to
adopt a universal definition of legitimacy because legitimacy usually varies according to context.56 He
argued that legitimacy can be understood in three different ways, as legal legitimacy, moral legitimacy,
and social legitimacy.57 Legal legitimacy can be perceived as legal validity from the perspective of positive
law.58 This perception of legitimacy largely reflects the general definition of legitimacy that was provided
above. In essence, legal legitimacy depends on compliance with a certain set of relevant, positive rules.
Moral legitimacy generally can be perceived as the “right to rule.”59 As Thomas further explained, moral
legitimacy is “a property of an action, rule, actor or system which signifies a moral obligation to submit to
or support that action, rule, actor or system.”60 This property can vary based on the rule in question. The
essence of this approach lies in the sense of a moral obligation to act in a certain way. This approach to
legitimacy stands far away from the positivist perception of the law. From the standpoint of moral
legitimacy, the obligation to obey certain rules flows not from their status concerning legally binding law
but instead, from the moral value of rules in question. As to the concept of moral values, for the purpose
of this article, they will be perceived as certain factual and significant benefits that can result from a state
or the international community obeying the rule in question.
51See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE]; BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999).
52Generally speaking, governments per se are not considered to be subjects of international law. A state and a
government are two distinct bodies in terms of international law, and only a state is a subject of that law.
53Legitimacy, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimacy (last visited
4 June 2017).
54DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (2d ed. 2013); see also Bodansky, supra note 48, at 5.
55See Bodansky, supra note 48, at 4–5.
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Lastly, there is the concept of social legitimacy. Social legitimacy is not based on the objective values
of the entity in question. Social legitimacy is a mere “belief that action, rule, actor or system is morally or
legally legitimate.”61 Accordingly, such legitimacy is not necessarily based on the actual qualities of a
discovered object, but rather on the perception of the object by others. Therefore, social legitimacy is a
subjective rather than objective judgment: if something is perceived as legitimate it is socially legitimate.62
Accordingly, the legitimacy of international law and, in particular, the legitimacy of CIL can be
discussed in light of the foregoing concepts of legitimacy. Legal and moral legitimacy fit within the
methodological framework of normative legitimacy.63 Normative legitimacy assesses the objective reasons
why a certain concept exists based on its moral, political, or legal standing.64 Social legitimacy, on the
other hand, must be discussed as a matter of descriptive legitimacy, an approach that evaluates the
opinions of the ruled rather than the objective qualities of the ruler.65
Furthermore, it is necessary to stress that there is no one determinant of legitimacy. In principle, it can
be said that only social legitimacy will determine compliance with a rule. The subjective perception of a
rule as legitimate or not will, in practice, affect the behavior of the entity in question. If something lacks
legal or moral legitimacy but is still perceived as legitimate, the objective legitimacy indicators become
somewhat irrelevant. An entity may act based on its subjective belief in legitimacy even though the
objective indicators may be absent.
On the other hand, it is necessary to stress that the concepts of legal and moral legitimacy are not
irrelevant; they are inherently linked to social legitimacy. Subjective views on legitimacy can be significantly
affected by the objective factors. For example, legal illegitimacy of a certain action may trigger the subjective
(social) perception of such an action as illegitimate. In other circumstances, however, moral legitimacy might
prevail over legal illegitimacy, with the result that certain illegal actions are subjectively perceived as
legitimate. One example is the NATO operation in Kosovo that was widely perceived as illegal but legitimate.66
To summarize, the most recognizable outcomes of legitimacy are based on the concept of social
legitimacy. Entities will construct their behavior based on their subjective perception of legitimacy.
However, legal and moral legitimacy often build up social legitimacy. Consequently, social legitimacy
affects the behavior of international actors as to the compliance or non-compliance with rules in question.
Therefore, the legitimacy of CIL can affect the level of compliance and general views on the latter.
The next sections will assess the legitimacy of customary international law based on each of the three
proposed types of legitimacy.
2.1. Legal legitimacy of customary international law
This section will assess CIL through the prism of the legal legitimacy. Thomas Franck has suggested a
comprehensive list of criteria to assess legal legitimacy.67 The proposed list includes “determinacy,
61Thomas, supra note 56, at 14.
62Id.
63Bodansky, supra note 47, at 8.
64Id..
65See Thomas, supra note 56, at 14–15.
66See generally Anthea Roberts, Legality vs. Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE (Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald eds., 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1518290.
67Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power
Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 93 (2006).
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symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.”68 Determinacy refers to the clarity of the content, and
Franck perceived it as one of the most important criteria.69 Symbolic validation refers to compliance with
certain figurative procedures that give legal power to a rule. Coherence of the law looks to “[t]he quality of
being logical and consistent.”70 Lastly, adherence is measured as “conformity with the legal system’s
secondary rules about norm creation.”71
It is sensible to start with the first and most important criterion: determinacy. Customary international
law, as with any other hard law, requires certain clarity of the content as a pre-condition for its effective
implementation and use. As was briefly mentioned above, even the primary existence of customary rules
relies on the presence of a core meaning that stays the same over a period of time.72 Accordingly, this
core meaning should be considered as part of assessing determinacy.
At first glance, there are examples of clear and straightforward CIL norms. Customary international
humanitarian law is a good example of CIL that fulfills the criterion of determinacy.73 A study by the
International Committee of the Red Cross provided an extensive list of rules that arguably can be
considered as CIL. The list includes, with great precision, the prohibition of indiscriminate attack,
precautions, and other fundamental principles of humanitarian law.74
A series of other fundamental rules can be found in the case law of international judicial bodies. For
instance, certain aspects of the law on the use of force were addressed by the I.C.J. in terms of CIL. The
court stressed that the right to self-defense and the prohibition of interventions reflect customary
international law.75 The court was quite straightforward with the wording of the rules in question.76
Accordingly, certain fundamental aspects of the law on the use of force are reflected in CIL with more or
less clear meaning.77
Additionally, CIL can be codified in treaties.78 Subsequently, such treaties can provide further guidance
on the content of CIL. Furthermore, treaties can expand obligations of states in comparison with CIL.
However, the rules of CIL still remain in power even for states that joined a treaty that codifies certain
rules of CIL.79
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that there are certain CIL rules that can comply with the criterion
of determinacy. The meaning and the content of those rules can be understood with a high degree of
precision. However, there is a strong agreement about meaning only for part of CIL. There is constant
tension and a lack of clarity over emerging rules of CIL and certain highly-contested concepts. For
68Id.
69Id.
70Coherence, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coherence (last visited
4 June 2017).
71Bodansky, supra note 47, at 13.
72See Wood, Second Report, supra note 18, at 36.
73See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, (Vol. I 2005; reprint
Vol. II 2009).
74Id., Vol. II, at Rules 11 & 14.
75Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at { 174.
76Id. {{ 183–187.
77Id.
78JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2011); see also North
Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at { 60.
79Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. { 174.
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example, it is unclear whether there is a right to democracy, a right to the truth, or even a right to political
participation under CIL.80
Going further, there is even a lack of clarity under CIL with regard to certain fundamental international
concepts. For example, there is continuing disagreement over which parts of UNCLOS constitute CIL.81 The
same problem arises for the “Draft Articles on State’s Responsibility” or even the Vienna Convention on
the Law of the Treaties. There is no definitive conclusion on which part(s) of those fundamental
documents are reflected in CIL.
In essence, it is always possible to argue that something has crystallized as a rule of CIL. However,
such an approach makes the entire branch of CIL too ambiguous. It is true that there are some well-
established rules that fall within the concept of determinacy. On the other hand, there is constant change
and tension for other CIL norms that, consequently, fall outside the concept of determinacy of the content.
This is not to say that these differences make the entire branch of CIL illegitimate in the legal sense.
However, a substantial part of CIL is open to overly broad interpretation or prompts questions about its
binding nature. It is true that there are guidelines on how to assess if a rule has crystallized as CIL; the
rules provided in the first section of this article can give certain guidance. However, it is still rather hard to
provide strong arguments for such subjective terms as opinio juris or to provide a fully convincing
overview of state practice.
Furthermore, the issue of consent to be bound by CIL is a significant problem. International law can be
considered a product of state consent.82 Yet some authors have argued that in certain circumstances it is
hard to find the evidence of even a tacit agreement to be bound by CIL.83 For example, what if a state is
unaware of an emerging rule or a state has no means to object to an emerging rule? It is possible to
argue that CIL sometimes bypasses the fundamental requirement of consent.
From another perspective, it can be argued that the practice of specially-affected states undermines the
notion of equality of sovereign states. For example, the practice of specially-affected states can bind all
other states that at the moment had no interests or resources to operate in certain fields.84 States can be
bound by CIL just because other more affected entities started to conduct various new activities. It can be
argued that such an approach frustrates the sovereign equality of states in international law, the
fundamental basis of that law. It can be further viewed as a lack of balance of contributing value when
it comes to the formation of CIL.
Therefore, many aspects of CIL can be considered legally illegitimate. In short, the vague content of
CIL, a partial lack of consent, and the diminished importance of the sovereign equality of states deprives
CIL of a viable claim to legal legitimacy. This conclusion suggests various negative outcomes. One of the
most obvious is the possibility that states will refuse to comply with CIL. However, the reason for this can
be found in the ambiguity of CIL rather than in the absence of legal legitimacy. But legal illegitimacy can
80See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 52; Anthony D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary
International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms (Nw. L., Faculty Working Papers No. 88, 2010), http://scholarlycomm
ons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/88 (last visited 12 Jan. 2015).
81JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (2013).
82See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10, art. 26; Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still
Matters - Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137 (2005).
83See generally Niels Petersen, The Role of Consent and Uncertainty in the Formation of Customary International Law
(Preprints Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, 2011), https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_04online.pdf.
84The example of Space Law comes to mind. A number of states that have just started to develop the capacity to
operate in space are already bound by the law that was established by a very few nations.
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also draw a lot of criticism to CIL as a part of international law. Indeed, it is possible to explain
the skepticism of various scholars based on the fundamental legal flaws of CIL that have been
addressed here.
2.2. Moral legitimacy and its impact on social legitimacy in
customary international law
A different conclusion results from basing the analysis on moral legitimacy. It is, admittedly, rather hard to
define moral legitimacy in precise terms. This article will address the moral standing of CIL by assessing
the practical benefits of CIL’s contribution to the general system of international law.
The problems with CIL legal legitimacy identified above should be perceived in light of the need for
international law to develop rapidly and be more consistent. For example, in Accelerated Formation of
Customary International Law, Scharf has argued in favor of CIL due to its practical value.85 According to
Scharf, the rules of CIL are more widespread in their binding power than treaty provisions.86 CIL is an
essential addition to the body of international law in terms of its binding power. For example, in certain
circumstances, CIL will fill in gaps in the obligations of states that do not want to join certain treaties. The
moral value of CIL flows from its ability to govern all with no distinction.87
In addition, the lack of withdrawal clauses in CIL adds consistency and stability to the applicable
international obligations.88 While CIL is a flexible branch of international law, it imposes certain
fundamental customary obligations that allow no withdrawal, in contrast with certain treaties.89 It should
be noted, though, that human rights law is less clear-cut in this regard. The law secures certain human
rights norms that are widespread and legally binding, and the norms have no withdrawal clauses.
But it is not clear which human rights are protected by CIL.90
Lastly, in some instances, CIL can fill in gaps in international law and govern new relationships
between states while the often lengthy process of negotiating a treaty proceeds.91 Scharf has provided an
example of this situation: UNCLOS negotiations started in 1973 and the convention was not concluded
until 1982.92 In contemporary practice, CIL can develop and crystallize much faster than such classical
treaty-making processes.93 CIL thus adds substantial value as an efficient stop-gap during treaty-making or
when there is no intent to conclude a treaty at all.
85Michael Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 INT’L L. STUDENT ASSOC. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
305, 309 (2014).
86Id.
87Note the exception of persistent objectors. However, it is a rather academic concept that is not precisely reflected in
the primary sources of international law. Going further, it is not well reflected in the I.L.C. study on CIL.
88Scharf, supra note 85, at 309.
89The example of Jus Cogens norms comes to mind. While a state can withdraw from ICCPR, CAT or ECHR, there is no
way to withdraw from the prohibition of torture in the sense of custom. Additionally, the same principle will apply to the
norms in UNCLOS, the Vienna Convention, and other treaties.
90See generally D’Amato, supra note 83; Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST’L Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 102-06 (1988–89); Reservations to Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Reports 15, 23 (28 May).
91Scharf, supra note 85, at 309.
92Id.; U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective)
(1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm.
93See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN
MOMENTS (2013).
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To summarize, CIL brings many practical challenges in the strictly legal sense. On the other hand, its
existence seems to be morally justified due to the value it contributes to international law. First, CIL can
establish more widespread obligations than can treaties. Second, it can start to govern new relations
between states faster than treaties, and it does not require an agreement on particular wording or on a
particular treaty. Third, the lack of withdrawal clauses can substantially contribute to moral legitimacy in
the protection and consistency of international obligations. Therefore, CIL is arguably morally legitimate
due to its positive contribution to international law.
What are the outcomes of this assessment? While the legal legitimacy of CIL is problematic, its social
legitimacy can be demonstrated by the de facto acceptance of CIL as a primary source of international
law. This acceptance can be proven with the reference to the Statute of the I.C.J., several cases that were
adjudicated based on CIL, and the common acceptance of CIL in the academic literature.94 Even though
there are a few scholars that argue that CIL should be divorced from contemporary international law, it is
still a matter of a common agreement that CIL forms a part of the international legal system. Following
this widespread acceptance of CIL it can be concluded that it is socially legitimate.
Furthermore, the moral legitimacy demonstrated above can explain the social legitimacy of CIL. Considering
the benefits of CIL for the efficiency of the international legal system, its moral legitimacy significantly
contributes to social legitimacy and the general acceptance of CIL. Overall, CIL is morally and socially legitimate.
The question of whether or not states will submit to such legitimate authority is rather more
complicated. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to obey CIL because it does bring practical
benefits to the international legal system. On the other hand, a lack of legal legitimacy and clarity can
make compliance with CIL somewhat more complicated. In the end, however, the general compliance with
the most fundamental CIL rules is undisputable.
3. Conclusion
This article has assessed CIL based on legitimacy concepts. Section One provided a comprehensive
overview of the current state of CIL. Two fundamental aspects of CIL were presented: State practice and
Opinio Juris. A brief description of their core elements and the ways to prove their existence was provided,
with reference to case law and academic literature. Part Two described the concept of legitimacy in
international law. It defined the concept of legitimacy and then divided it into the three concepts of legal,
moral, and social legitimacy, explaining each through the prism of theoretical knowledge. Part Three
applied the legitimacy concepts to assess whether CIL can be considered legitimate.
This analysis has led to several conclusions. CIL may not be legally legitimate because it can be too
ambiguous, bypasses the requirement of tacit consent, and breaches the principle of sovereign equality of
states. However, CIL is morally legitimate due to the benefits it provides for international law. The moral
value of CIL lies in its ability to be widespread, avoid withdrawal from obligations, and fill in gaps in
international law. Lastly, CIL is socially legitimate because it is de facto accepted by the international
community.
For CIL, the practical effect of such mixed legitimacy is rather unclear. It is possible to argue that States
will comply with CIL due to its partial legitimacy. However, the lack of legal clarity and the resulting legal
illegitimacy may cause certain complications when it comes to compliance with CIL.
94See, e.g., Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep., para. 71–73; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3; Asylum (Colom. v.
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266; see also basic international law textbooks such as SHAW, supra note 9.
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